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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida courts continue to decide numerous cases in the area of sub-
stantive criminal law. Keeping up with the recent pronouncements of
Florida's courts in this area obviously presents a challenge to the busy
practitioner. This article discusses Supreme Court of Florida decisions in
the area of substantive criminal law handed down between July 1, 1995 and
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; LL.M., Temple University, 1978; J.D., Catholic University, 1973; B.A.,
Georgetown University.
1
Dobson: Criminal Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
July 1, 1996.1 As with past survey articles on criminal law, this one does not
discuss issues regarding the death penalty or other sentencing issues. Both
these topics have become so specialized that they deserve separate, special
treatment. Even after cases mainly involving the death penalty and other
sentencing issues2 are eliminated, the survey does not discuss every Supreme
Court of Florida case. Cases which merely discuss the application of settled
or fairly standard fact situations to a well-settled rule of law have also been
eliminated.3 When a particular area of substantive criminal law is discussed
in the text of this article, cases from the Florida district courts of appeal
discussing the same area are mentioned in the footnotes accompanying that
section to help supplement the textual discussion. Otherwise, Florida district
court opinions are not the subject of this article. Similarly, new legislation is
mentioned only when it relates to the continuing importance of a discussed
case.
This article is divided into two main parts. The first part discusses the
Supreme Court of Florida cases concerning major questions of substantive
criminal law that do not involve constitutional issues. The second part
discusses Supreme Court of Florida cases involving constitutional challenges
to substantive criminal law statutes in Florida.
1I. NON-CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
A. Kidnapping
This past year the Supreme Court of Florida decided an important
case clarifying once again what constitutes the offense of kidnapping in
Florida. Section 787.01(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes defines the basic
1. The author has chosen as a cut-off point decisions reported up to, and including 673
So. 2d. Thus, as in last year's article, some major Supreme Court of Florida cases decided
before July 1, 1996 may not be included in this article. Major Supreme Court of Florida cases
decided before July 1, 1995, but not included in last year's survey, are discussed in this year's
article.
2. Indeed, cases discussing sentencing guidelines and related topics were a major focus of
a significant number of Supreme Court of Florida cases this last survey year. Readers
interested in these areas should consult the recent supreme court decisions referenced in
APPENDIX A to this article.
3. Thus, a number of Supreme Court of Florida decisions involving homicide offenses are
not discussed in this article. Readers interested in supreme court cases discussing whether the
state has proven a particular homicide offense may wish to consult the opinions in APPENDIX B
to this article.
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offense of kidnapping.4  This section provides that either "confining,
abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful
authority" 5 by any of three specified means is kidnapping when the act was
done to further or to accomplish a specific purpose. The three specified
means are "forcibly, secretly, or by threat." 6
Kidnapping is a specific intent crime.7 There are four different specific
purposes for kidnapping under section 787.01(a):8  1) kidnapping for
ransom, reward, or as a shield or hostage;9 2) kidnapping in connection with
4. The remaining two subsections of section 787.01 set forth the sentencitig provisions
and establish an additional offense when a young child (under 1) is kidnapped with
aggravating circumstances.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(a) (1995). One recent Supreme Court of Florida opinion
implies that the confinement, abduction, or imprisonment must be at least partially successful
for there to be a kidnapping. See Rogers v. State, 660 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1995) (reversing the
kidnapping conviction of a driver whom the defendant ordered at gunpoint to drive in a
certain direction). In Rogers, the court held that since the driver refused and drove in a
different direction, there was insufficient evidence to support a kidnapping conviction. Id. at
241. As kidnapping is a specific intent crime, one would think that attempted kidnapping
would be a possible lesser included offense here. However, for reasons not stated, the court's
opinion does not discuss this.
6. Id. Chapter 787 provides no definition of these specified means. Arguably, the term
"forcibly" means by actual use of physical force, while the term "by threat" means by
threatened use of either physical force or some other harm. Otherwise, the terms would be
redundant.
"Secretly" has been defined as "intended ... to isolate or insulate the intended victim
from meaningful contact or communication with the public." See Robinson v. State, 462 So.
2d 471, 476 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 471 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1985) (citing
Miller v. State, 233 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970)). See also McCarter v. State,
463 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 472 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1985). For
example, the Robinson court found that the defendant's act of asking a sexual assault victim
whether she needed a ride and then driving to a secluded area without the victim being aware
of what was happening or where she was being taken constituted a secret abduction.
7. See Heddleson v. State, 512 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Gra-
ham, 468 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mills v. State, 407 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
8. See Justus v. State, 438 So. 2d 358, 367 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052
(1984) (declaring that "the four clauses pertaining to criminal intent [are] set out [in the]
disjunctiv[e], so that there are four alternative means by which one can form the intent to
commit kidnapping.").
9. FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(a)1. This section was discussed in a recent important case
decided during this survey period. In Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1995), the defendant appealed a conviction for the armed kidnapping of his infant son.
Lafleur claimed that as he was the boy's father, therefore, he could not be legally convicted of
kidnapping his own child. The district court disagreed for two reasons, First, the court noted
that another district court opinion, Johnson v. State, 637 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1996]
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another felony; ° 3) kidnapping to inflict bodily harm or to terrorize;" and 4)
kidnapping to interfere with a governmental or political function. 12  The
most frequently encountered factual scenario involves allegations that the act
constituting the kidnapping was done with the intent to satisfy the second of
these four possible purposes, i.e., to "[c]ommit or facilitate commission of
any felony."'13 Florida courts recognize that there are problems with apply-
ing this subsection too literally to other felonies, the elements of which
involve some confinement or movement of another person. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of Florida, in its first case discussing section 787.01(1)(a)2
after its passage, noted that "[i]f construed literally this subsection would
apply to any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful
confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery."' 4 Thus,
any confinement for purposes of these crimes would automatically make the
offender liable for kidnapping as well.
States have adopted three basic approaches to deal with this issue: 1)
the "any movement or confinement" approach, making any movement or
confinement of another except those absolutely necessary to commit the
other felony kidnapping;' 5 2) the "incidental" approach making only those
1994), review denied, 649 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1994) which announced "[t]he general rule ...
that a parent cannot be found guilty of kidnapping ... for taking his child from the other
parent" was inapplicable because in Johnson there was no court order awarding custody to the
parent from whom the child was taken, whereas in Lafleur such an order had been made.
Lafleur, 661 So. 2d at 348. Second, Johnson does not control when the child is taken for an
ulterior purpose, as opposed to exercising the taking parent's parental rights. Id. Lafleur,
during the abduction, had initially refused to give the boy up as the boy was "his 'ace in the
hole."' Also, the boy was taken to force his mother to return to Lafleur. This second reason,
if taken literally, will become the primary focus of inquiry whenever a parent is accused of
kidnapping his or her child. Regardless of whether a custody order exists or not, taking one's
child for an unlawful purpose should not be condoned. However, applying this reasoning too
literally may result in turning domestic disputes into kidnapping offenses. Where a child is
forcibly taken at gunpoint by one parent from another parent, no one will probably feel any
qualms in having the parent who used potentially deadly force convicted of kidnapping. But
in other scenarios, applying Lafleur's language literally may lead to unwarranted extensions of
the kidnapping offense.
10. FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(a)2.
11. Id § 787.01(l)(a)3.
12. Id § 787.01(1)(a)4.
13. Id. § 787.01(1)(a)2. This subsection has by far the most reported cases discussing
kidnapping and seems to be the most common intent charged for kidnapping in Florida.
14. See Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031, 1034 (Fla. 1982).
15. This approach would appear to produce a larger number of convictions than the other
two. For a list of cases illustrating this approach, see Comment, Criminal Law: Lowering the
Threshold for Kidnapping to Facilitate a Felony, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 528, 529 nn. 15-16
(1983).
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acts of victim movement or confinement that are materially different from
the other felony kidnapping; and 3) the Model Penal Code approach making
only "[movement] from [the victim's] place of residence or business, or a
substantial distance from the vicinity where [the victim] is found"'16 or
"unlawfully confin[ing the victim] for a substantial period in a place of
isolation" 17 kidnapping.1
8
The Supreme Court of Florida in Faison v. State19 selected the second
of these three approaches. Faison required that a three-part test be satisfied
before an accused could be convicted of kidnapping under section
787.0(1)(a)2. Under this test, the movement or confinement:
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental
to the other crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other
crime; and
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other
crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of com-
mission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. 20
Proof of each factor is necessary for a kidnapping conviction under section
787.01(1)2.21
Unfortunately, this test has been easier to state than to apply. Once
again during this survey year, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Berry v.
State,22 reconciled a split between two district courts of appeal as to whether
certain facts support a conviction under section 787.01(1)(a)2 for kidnap-
ping. Berry and some accomplices entered an apartment and robbed two
victims at gunpoint. One victim was immediately bound and left in the same
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1.
17. Id.
18. In Faison, Justice Boyd forcefully argued for a fourth approach which would make
victim movement or confinement during another felony kidnapping only when such acts
"expose the victim to a risk of physical or mental harm substantially greater than the risk of
harm ordinarily encountered by the victim of the forcible felony being committed ......
Faison, 426 So. 2d at 968 (Boyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a
discussion praising this approach and urging its adoption, see Matthew J. King, Note,
Kidnapping in Florida: Don't Move or You've Done It, 13 STETSON L. REv. 197, 205-08;
211-14 (1985).
19. 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983).
20. Id. at 965.
21. Kirtsey v. State, 511 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing FLA.
STAT. § 787.01(1)2).
22. 668 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1996).
19961
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room where he was when the robbers entered. The robbers forced the other
victim to accompany them to each room and show them where any valuables
may be located. Afterwards, this victim was tied hand and foot before the
robbers left. Unfortunately for the robbers, he freed himself shortly after
their departure and called the police. At trial, Berry was convicted of both
armed robbery and kidnapping. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed his kidnapping conviction finding that the act of tying up a victim
by itself could support a kidnapping under Faison.23 The supreme court
granted review to resolve an apparent conflict between this decision and the
first district's opinion in another case.24
The supreme court first noted that tying someone up clearly constituted
a "confinement" under section 787.01(1) and that under the facts, such
confinement was also clearly not willful.2 5 Likewise, the court noted that the
defendant's actions constituting the alleged kidnapping were done to commit
or facilitate commission of a felony, in this case robbery.26 Therefore, taken
literally, the elements of section 787.01(1)(a) had all been proven. However,
because of the purpose for which the alleged acts of kidnapping were taken,
the Faison test needed to be applied to see if Berry could be found guilty of
this offense.
Applying Faison, the supreme court easily concluded that tying up the
victims satisfied the first Faison requirement that the confinement 7 "not be
slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime."28  The
court noted that if the victims had been held at gunpoint until the robbery
was completed, this would be a confinement, but that the court would have
found it incidental to the robbery's commission. Likewise, if the robbers
had made the victims go from room to room and later merely left them in a
room with orders to stay there until the robbers had left, this would also be
incidental. The court noted that "[i]n both hypotheticals, any confinement
accompanying the robbery would cease naturally with the robbery. '2 9 Here,
23. Berry v. State, 652 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
24. See Brinson v. State, 483 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So.
2d 1335 (1986).
25. Berry, 668 So. 2d at 969.
26. Id.
27. In Berry, the court noted that the Faison test should be read in the disjunctive as
applying to either confinement or movement. Here, the supreme court focused on the
defendant's actions in tying up the victims and thus only discussed "confinement." Berry, 652
So. 2d at 838.
28. Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965.
29. Beny, 668 So. 2d at 969.
[Vol. 21:101
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however, the robbers clearly intended the confinement to continue after the
robbery was over.
30
Faison's second requirement that the confinement "not be of the kind
inherent in the nature of the other crime" 31 was also easily satisfied. Tying
someone up is not needed to commit a robbery. Indeed, the victims could
have been left untied and a robbery would have still occurred.
Finally, Berry concluded that Faison's third requirement was also met.
The court concluded that tying the victims up "was a confinement with
independent significance from the underlying felony in that it substantially
reduced the risk of detection." 32  Indeed, the court could find no other
purpose for leaving the victims bound other than to limit the risk of being
caught. The fact that one victim shortly afterwards untied himself and
frustrated this purpose made no difference as attainment of the confine-
ment's objectives was irrelevant; what mattered was the intended purpose
behind them.
33
Berry demonstrates that questions about the proper application of
Faison will continue to arise in the Florida courts. The court attributes some
of the difficulty in applying Faison to both the failure to distinguish between
"confinement" and "movement" and the failure to recognize Faison used
these terms disjunctively rather than conjunctively. However, Berry can-
30. Despite the robbers' goal in tying up the victims, one of them was able to free himself
almost immediately and call the police. The supreme court discusses this fact with reference
to Faison's third requirement but not with the first requirement. Id. at 970.
The court's language could bring about very different results depending on the words the
robbers use. Under the court's test, if the robbers put victims in a room and tell them not to
come out until the robbers leave, the confinement would be inconsequential. But what if the
robbers tell the victims not to leave until ten or twenty minutes have passed? The victims
would still not be bound as in the first scenario but they would be confined longer than needed
for the robbery to be completed if they comply with the robbers' commands. Under this
second scenario, would the robbers additionally be guilty of kidnapping?
This question, and others that could be posed about differences in the court's examples,
show that under Faison, as with probably any test designed to be applied to a myriad of fact
situations, questions about the test's proper application will continue to persist.
31. Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965.
32. Berry, 668 So. 2d at 970.
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. The Berry opinion does not discuss what
possible effect on the first Faison requirement one victim's being able to free himself quickly
had. The court's discussion of the first Faison requirement speaks in terms of actual
continued confinement beyond a robbery's completion. If this is really what the court intends
is needed to satisfy this requirement then why didn't the escape of one victim frustrate that
here? Was the state perhaps lucky in that there was a second victim who was not freed until
later? Does that mean Berry actually committed only one kidnapping and not two?
1996]
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didly acknowledges that "the diverse factual situations to which [Faison]
must be applied" 34 means that the complete elimination of questions under
this test is not likely to occur.35 In Berry, the supreme court discussed how
Faison should be applied to a particular situation. The trial and district
courts now have one more useful opinion to serve as guidance in applying
the law of kidnapping in Florida.
B. Felon in Possession of Weapons
Under section 790.23(1) of the Florida Statutes, persons convicted of a
felony under the law of any state or country are prohibited from possessing
or controlling firearms or other electric weapons including tear gas guns and
chemical weapons.36 Violation of this section is a second degree felony.37
The status of the accused as a convicted felon must be proven as an
element of this charge.38 The Florida district courts of appeal have been split
as to whether the pendency of an appeal renders one a "convicted" felon
within the meaning of section 790.23. During this last survey year, the
Supreme Court of Florida handed down two short, but important, opinions
dealing with this question.
The first case, State v. Snyder,39 directly addressed the split between the
appellate districts over when someone should be considered a "convicted"
felon for purposes of section 790.23. 40 Snyder had been convicted and
sentenced for grand theft.4 1 During the pendency of his appeal from this
34. Berry, 668 So. 2d at 970.
35. See supra notes 30 & 33 (providing further questions which the author believes Berry
leaves unanswered).
36. This includes juveniles adjudicated for an offense that would be considered a felony if
the juvenile was an adult. FLA. STAT. § 790.23(l)(c) (1995). Proof of the possession element
needed to sustain a conviction under this section may be based on the uncontroverted
testimony of a single witness. See Cordero v. State, 669 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 678 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1996).
37. FLA. STAT. § 790.23(3).
38. See Killingsworth v. State, 584 So. 2d 647 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
39. 673 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1996).
40. Snyder dealt with former section 790.23. See FLA. STAT. § 790.23 (1991). Since
Snyder's conviction the legislature has amended this section. Unlike present section
790.23(1), the former version of this statute did not apply to juveniles adjudicated of what
would have been felonies had the proceedings taken place in an adult court.
41. Snyder was a minor but was convicted and sentenced as an adult. At the time of his
later charge, if Snyder had merely been adjudicated a delinquent, section 790.23(1) could not
have been used to support a felon in possession of a firearm charge. See J.B.M. v. State, 560
So. 2d 347 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Section 790.23 has been amended to include
juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses. See FLA. STAT. § 790.23(1)(a).
[Vol. 2 1: 101
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conviction, he was arrested for firing a rifle in his backyard. Shortly after
his arrest, the second district affirmed his treatment as an adult for the grand
theft conviction, but remanded due to other errors in sentencing.42 Subse-
quently, Snyder was tried and convicted of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Snyder appealed claiming that he had not been "convicted"
for purposes of section 790.23 at the time he had possessed the rifle since his
appeal was still pending.
The second district reluctantly agreed but noted the direct conflict with
cases from other districts. The supreme court framed the issue before it as
"whether a defendant is 'convicted' for purposes of section 790.23 ... when
adjudicated guilty in the trial court, notwithstanding [the existence of an
appeal or other procedure to challenge the conviction]." 43 The court noted
that the one district court" which answered this question affirmatively did so
for two distinct reasons: the presumption of the correctness of verdicts and
the irrelevancy of a pending appeal or other post conviction procedures to
the legislative policy behind section 790.23. The supreme court in Snyder
focused on the second of these reasons to uphold the conviction in this case.
The court found that this criminal offense provision was "intended to
protect the public by preventing the possession of firearms by persons who,
because of their past conduct, have demonstrated their unfitness to be
entrusted with such dangerous instrumentalities." 45 Whether an appeal or
other procedure challenging a felon's conviction is pending was found
irrelevant to this legislative policy.46 An adjudication of guilt, even if later
found to be incorrect for whatever reason, thus serves as a kind of prima
facie indication of dangerousness, indicating the person adjudicated is
presumptively unfit as a matter of law to carry dangerous items.47 Thus, the
42. Snyder v. State, 597 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
43. Snyder, 673 So. 2d at 10 (footnote omitted).
44. Burkett v. State, 518 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
45. Snyder, 673 So. 2d at 10 (citing Nelson v. State, 195 So. 2d 853, 855 & n.8 (Fla.
1967)).
46. Indeed, Snyder declared that "[t]he legislature never intended for convicted felons to
posses firearms during the pendency of their appeals." Id. at 11.
47. This presumption or assumption behind section 790.23 is obviously not universally
true in fact for all cases. Clearly the commission of all kinds of felonies are not in actuality a
true indication of dangerousness. A person who commits a grand theft by stealthy means is
certainly a lot less dangerous than one who commits a robbery or an aggravated battery. The
latter two kinds of felonies involve some element of violence or intimidation while the former
does not. Indeed, if grand theft is accomplished by force against a person, it should become a
robbery.
19961
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court held that "a defendant is 'convicted,' for purposes of [section 790.23,]
when he is adjudicated guilty in the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that
he has the right to contest the validity of the conviction by appeal or by other
procedures."48
Snyder's holding is clearly correct for several reasons. One, it certainly
seems to help promote the legislative policy behind section 790.23. Appeals
and other challenges to the validity of convictions take at least months, if not
years, to exhaust. Should a convicted felon be allowed to posses a firearm
during this time? If the conviction is affirmed, the defendant has received an
undeserved grace period during which firearm possession would be allowed.
Second, a contrary decision in Snyder would only raise additional questions
about when a person should be considered a "convicted" felon under section
790.23. For example, what if the conviction is affirmed by a district court
but the defendant tries either successfully or unsuccessfully to convince the
supreme court to review it? How about the time when habeas corpus or
other post-conviction relief challenges can still be filed, could a defendant
still possess firearms during this time? In this situation, line-drawing is
inevitable. Thus, the most logical place to draw the line would be where it
most effectuates legislative and other policies. This is clearly at the trial
court level. After Snyder, all persons who are accused and adjudicated as
felons have clear notice they cannot possess, at least until something
happens to officially undermine the validity of their convictions, the items
specified in section 790.23.49 Finally, although the supreme court did not
However, section 790.23 makes no distinctions between the kinds of felonies or how they
were factually committed. Anyone convicted of a felony, no matter how non-dangerous that
person may actually be, is considered legally too dangerous to possess the kinds of items
noted in section 790.23.
48. Burkett, 518 So. 2d at 1366 (footnote omitted).
49. Notice is clearly an important concept in the criminal law. However, all persons are
presumed to know the law and conduct themselves so as not to violate it. Therefore, a
convicted felon should not be able to plead ignorance of the law as a defense, nor should
convicted felons be able to plead ignorance of their predicate felonies as a defense. See
Burkett v. State, 518 So. 2d 1363, 1364 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
However, at least one decision from another state has allowed an accused's ignorance of
his underlying felony to serve as a defense to this type of charge. In People v. Bray, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), the accused had made multiple attempts to ascertain if his out-
of-state conviction was a felony. Even the prosecuting attorney admitted to having had
difficulty in finding out this fact. The appellate court under these circumstances found that
Bray's conviction should be reversed. To this writer, Bray is an example of where the sound
exercise of prosecutorial judgment in not filing charges to begin with should have been
followed.
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discuss this as a reason behind its decision, the holding in Snyder promotes
the principle of verdict finality. Even though a result may later be over-
turned on appeal, we should treat a verdict as final unless or until it is
otherwise unreasonable to do so.
50
Snyder also addressed the issue of what should happen to a defendant
convicted under, section 790.23 during the pendency of an appeal from the
conviction of a predicate felony which is subsequently reversed. If the court
chose to strictly follow the public policy behind section 790.23, one result
would be to say that the subsequent reversal has no effect on the conviction
under section 790.23. However, this result also appears inherently unfair.
What if the appellate reversal came one day after the adjudication of guilt
under section 790.23, should the conviction still stand? The supreme court
in Snyder decided that "fairness requires that [a defendant] be permitted to
attack a conviction for possession of a firearm when the predicate felony
conviction is subsequently reversed on appeal."5' Thus, the court held that
"such a defendant is entitled to relief through a Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 motion to vacate judgment. 52
In its second decision discussing section 790.23 during this survey
period, the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Johnson53 followed Snyder's
reasoning to approve a lower court decision vacating the defendant's
conviction for felony possession of a firearm under section 790.23. Johnson
had first been convicted of a felony battery and had appealed this conviction.
During the appeal's pendency, he was arrested for possession of a firearm
and charged under section 790.23. Johnson plead nolo contendere to this
charge but moved to set it aside when the appellate court later reversed his
battery conviction. The trial court denied the motion. However, the district
Ironically in Snyder, the notion that people should know the law worked to the defen-
dant's benefit. Since the controlling law in the second district would have allowed Snyder to
continue legally possessing firearms at the time he fired the rifle, the supreme court found that
he was entitled to rely on it. Thus, applying the supreme court's decision to his case to uphold
his conviction would be analogous to convicting him under an ex post facto law. The supreme
court therefore approved the reversal of Snyder's conviction although it disapproved the
second district's reasoning for it.
50. Snyder's holding is consistent with the principle of verdict finality found in other
substantive law areas. For example, under section 90.610(2) of the Florida Statutes, the
pendency of an appeal does not make an otherwise admissible conviction inadmissible for
impeachment purposes.
51. Snyder, 673 So. 2d at 11.
52. Id. See also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(a) (providing the appropriate method for filing
such a motion).
53. 668 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1996). Johnson and Snyder were actually decided on the same
1996]
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court of appeals found Johnson was entitled to post-conviction relief based
on the same reasoning the supreme court used in Snyder.5 4 The Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the granting of such relief and the vacating of
Johnson's conviction for possessing a firearm while a convicted felon.
Snyder and Johnson will most likely somewhat increase the number of
convictions being vacated on post-conviction relief, as well as possibly
increasing the number of rule 3.850 motions filed. However, the combined
result of the decisions in these two cases help bring certainty and fairness to
the law.
C. Tampering With Evidence
Under section 918.13 of the Florida Statutes, it is a third degree
felony55 to tamper with or fabricate physical evidence under certain situa-
tions. There are several elements which must be proven before a conviction
under this section appears possible. First, a "criminal trial or proceeding or
an investigation" 56 must be in existence or about to be initiated. Second, this
must have been begun by a lawful authority. 57 Third, the accused must know
about the existence of the first two elements. Fourth, the accused must
"[a]lter, destroy, conceal or remove' '58 some physical object. Finally, this
must be done "with the purpose to impair its ... [use] in [the particular]
proceeding or investigation. 59
The Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Jennings60 recently discussed
how this statute can be violated. In this case, the defense filed a motion to
dismiss to the State's charge that Jennings tampered with physical evidence.
The defense alleged that police officers approached Jennings after seeing
him holding what they believed was marijuana. As one officer approached
Jennings, the officer also believed Jennings was holding cocaine rocks in his
hand. This officer shouted "police" and Jennings either simultaneously or
immediately afterwards tossed the suspected cocaine into his mouth. The
officers grabbed Jennings and eventually arrested him. However, Jennings
had swallowed the objects tossed into his mouth, and these were never
54. Johnson v. State, 664 So. 2d 986, 987-88 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
55. FLA. STAT. § 918.13(2) (1995).
56. Id. § 918.13(l).
57. The specific authorities listed in section 918.13(1) are a "prosecuting authority, law
enforcement agency, grand jury or [state] legislative committee." Id.
58. IM § 918.13(1)(a).
59. Id.
60. 666 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1995).
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recovered. Since the State did not file a traverse, the alleged facts were
assumed to be true for purposes of ruling on the motion.
The trial court granted the motion finding as a matter of law, that
swallowing the suspected cocaine rocks could not constitute the needed act
of "conceal[ment], remov[al], [destruction or alteration].' The third
district affirmed, but on a different basis.62  That court concluded that
Jennings could not be guilty of the charged offense since he "was neither
under arrest nor did he know that a law enforcement officer was about to
instigate an investigation." 63 The supreme court granted review to resolve a
certified conflict split between this district courts on this issue.
4
The supreme court first addressed the trial court's ruling that, as a
matter of law, swallowing an object65 could not constitute the needed
destruction or concealment for a conviction. The trial court had relied on
Boice v. State66 for this conclusion. In Boice, undercover police sold the
defendant a bag of cocaine. Immediately after this, uniformed officers
surrounded Boice's car. Boice threw the bag out of his car, but officers
retrieved it from the roadway. The bag and cocaine had not been altered in
any way. The second district found that since the bag had been tossed into
the open roadway and not otherwise concealed in any manner, there had
been no alteration or concealment under the statute. Rather, the district
61. FLA. STAT. § 918.13(1)(a).
62. State v. Jennings, 647 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
63. Id. at 295. The district court distinguished this case from other cases where the de-
fendant had been placed under arrest before swallowing the object involved. See McKinney v.
State,640 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); McKenzie v. State, 632 So. 2d 276 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Under this scenario, the district court would either have found
Jennings guilty of tampering with evidence if the swallowed object was not recovered and
attempted tampering if it was recovered. For a post-Jennings case finding the accused not
guilty of tampering with evidence and citing McKinney, as authority, see State v. Gilmore, 658
So. 2d 629 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), where an accused who was confronted by officers
for the purpose of arresting him placed a bag of marijuana in his mouth but later spit it out on
the officer's demand and was found not guilty of tampering with evidence. The court found
that "[a]t most, such conduct may be attempted tampering." Id. However, the court did not
rule as such for unexplained reasons.
64. The district court and the supreme court found that there was conflict between the
third district's opinion and the fourth district's decision in Hayes v. State, 634 So. 2d 1153
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 645 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1994).
65. The supreme court noted that it made no difference what Jennings had swallowed, as
long as all the elements were satisfied, since section 918.13(1)(a) pertained to "any record,
document, or thing." Thus, as long as a physical object of some sort is involved, section
918.13 forbids its tampering or alteration under the circumstances specified.
66. 560 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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court characterized this as "merely abandon[ing] the evidence,"67 which
would not violate section 918.13.68 In Jennings, the Supreme Court of
Florida rejected the district court's interpretation of Boice as too broad.6 9
The supreme court found that depending on the circumstances,70 "tossing
evidence away in the presence of a law enforcement officer ... could
amount to tampering or concealing evidence.'
The supreme court then turned to the district court's ruling that under
the facts Jennings could not have known an investigation of the object was
about to occur. The supreme court agreed with the district court's conclu-
sion that Jennings was not under arrest when he swallowed the suspected
rocks. However, that did not mean he could not possess the requisite
67. Id. at 1384.
68. Boice felt that a contrary decision could lead to scenarios that the legislature did not
intend. The court gave as an example a teenager, who when confronted by police for illegally
drinking beer, throws the beer can from his car. Boice noted that if this was concealment
under section 918.13, the teenager could be guilty of a third degree felony when the suspected
crime initiating the act of concealment was merely a misdemeanor.
69. Thus, the supreme court did not disapprove Boice, but merely limited its holding to
the specific situation involved.
70. The court unfortunately did not explain what these circumstances were. However,
Jennings cites, with apparent approval, Hayes v. State, 634 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 645 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1994), wherein the district court found that
throwing a bag of suspected rock cocaine into a drain while being chased by a law enforce-
ment officer was tampering with evidence.
If the supreme colrt intended Hayes to serve as an example of when tossing something
away in an officer's presence can be tampering or concealing evidence, then courts will have
to distinguish between acts of merely discarding an object and acts of discarding an object in
such a way that it cannot likely be retrieved and used against the person getting rid of it.
For a recent case from another state finding that merely abandoning narcotics while being
pursued by a law enforcement officer is not sufficient to support a conviction for tampering
with evidence, see Commonwealth v. Delgado, 679 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1996). The Pennsylvania
statute in question in this case is substantially similar to section 918.13 of the Florida
Statutes.
71. Jennings, 666 So. 2d at 133. The court cited with approval both McKinney and
McKenzie, two cases also cited with approval by the district court. Since the supreme court
reversed the district court's decision, readers of these two opinions may be initially confused
with how both courts could cite the same two cases with approval. However, the cases were
cited by these two courts when discussing different issues. The supreme court cited them to
refute the trial court's reasoning, not the district court's.
Readers should also note that the supreme court did not find that the act of swallowing
potential evidence will always be concealment, merely that it sometimes could be. The trial
court had ruled, pursuant to its ruling on the motion to dismiss (which could only be granted if
these facts were insufficient as a matter of law), that such an act could never constitute
concealment.
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knowledge. Jennings had swallowed the objects as soon as the word
"police" had been shouted. Again, viewing this fact from the standard of
whether reasonable people could find Jennings knew of the impending
police investigation, the supreme court found reasonable minds could differ
and thus found that granting a motion to dismiss on this point was inappro-
priate.
Jennings is clearly an important decision from a law enforcement
standpoint. Section 918.13 was passed to protect the integrity of criminal
proceedings by preventing destruction or alteration of evidence relevant to
them. Swallowing drugs is one of the easiest ways to avoid their seizure by
police. If such an act could not constitute destruction or concealment, then
suspects could possibly avoid prosecution both under section 918.13 and
drug offense statutes by simply tossing the suspected items into their mouths
and gulping them down before the police could stop this.72 Surely, the
legislature would not want such absurd results along with the obvious
frustration of law enforcement efforts. Likewise, people may know that they
will be the subject of an investigation prior to being formally under arrest.
The supreme court was clearly correct in deciding that both questions posed
by Jennings should be determined on a case by case basis according to the
facts and not as an absolute matter of law in either situation.
D. Burglary
Burglary, at common law, was the breaking and entering of the dwelling
house of another in the nighttime in order to commit a felony therein.
Modem burglary statutes have significantly broadened this definition. 73
72. Alternatively, following the trial court's ruling would possibly lead to more situations
where police would wrestle with or choke suspects to avoid having them swallow evidence.
This could lead to more injuries to the police and suspects alike.
Of course, police could also wait until the suspect defecates or alternatively have the
suspect's stomach forcibly pumped. One assumes that few officers would have the incentive
to go to such lengths.
Readers who believe such scenarios never occur should remember Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952), where police officers broke into a suspect's bedroom and then choked
Rochin in an effort to prevent him from swallowing two capsules that he had tossed into his
mouth. When the police were unsuccessful in these efforts to obtain the potential evidence,
they handcuffed Rochin and took him to a hospital where his stomach was pumped to force
him to vomit up the items. Although these efforts were successful, the Supreme Court
suppressed the evidence because the police actions were so extreme that they violated Due
Process.
73. Section 810.02(1) of the Florida Statutes defines "burglary" as "entering or remain-
ing in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein,
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Florida's definition of burglary has been expanded beyond the common law
to protect structures and conveyances as well as dwellings.74 Similarly, the
intruder need not have the intent to commit a felony; the intent to commit
any criminal offense would do. The burglary chapter's definitions of
"structures, 75 and "dwellings ' 76 also include the "curtilage" 77 of these two
places. However, the term "curtilage" is not specifically defined in chapter
810 or elsewhere in the Florida Statutes.7 8 Florida courts have previously
unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to
enter or remain." FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1995).
Under this definition, non-consent to the entry or remaining in the dwelling is not an
element of the offense. Rather, consent is an affirmative defense which the accused must
raise. See Strachn v. State, 661 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Ordinarily, a
person would ordinarily be incapable of burglarizing his own home. However, this may not
always be the case. Recently, in a case of apparent first impression, the Second District Court
of Appeal found that a husband who violated a court restraining order by entering his former
home to commit a crime inside could be legally found guilty of burglary, since at the time of
entry he "did not have a possessory right in the premises." State v. Suarez-Mesa, 662 So. 2d
735, 736 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 669 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1996).
For a recent case discussing the "entering" element of burglary, see Braswell v. State, 671
So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. 88,012, 1996 LEXIS 1588, at *1 (Fla.
Aug. 26, 1996) (finding that the accused entered a conveyance by reaching into the open bed
of a pickup truck and taking personal property from it).
For recent cases discussing the sufficiency of evidence to support burglary convictions,
see Persaud v. State, 659 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 667 So. 2d
775 (Fla. 1996) (finding that when the defendant was stopped in his car filled with stolen
property from a dwelling, shortly after a citizen had reported what looked like a possible
break-in, this could support a burglary of a dwelling conviction) and Walker v. State, 656 So.
2d 950 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that a defendant could be convicted of burglary
based on the finding of his fingerprint on the window of a back bedroom that was used as the
point of illegal entry).
74. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1).
75. See id. § 810.011(1). This section begins its definition by describing a "[s]tructure"
as "a building of any kind .... Similar language is used at the start of the definition of
"[d]welling." See id. § 810.011(2).
The word "building" is not defined in chapter 810. Recently, the fourth district in Dozier
v. State, 662 So. 2d 382, 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), found no error in a trial court's
instruction to jurors in a burglury trial that for the purpose of defining structure, "there's no
special legal definition for building, so you should take building to mean what is normally
associated with the term in your every day life."
76. See FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2).
77. Both subsections (1) and (2) of section 810.011 contain the language "together with
the 'curtilage' thereof' in their definitions of structure and dwelling. FLA. STAT. §
810.011(l)-(2). However, not all statutory definitions of burglary include "curtilage." See
MODELPENALCODE § 221.1(1).
78. Whether certain conduct takes place within the "curtilage" of a dwelling is also rele-
vant to charges of disorderly conduct under section 877.03 of the Florida Statutes. See Miller
[Vol. 2 1: 101
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss1/5
Dobson
interpreted the term "curtilage" to include a structure's enclosed grounds, 9
fenced-in yard,80 enclosed parking area,8 1 garage,8 2 and driveway.8 3 Under
the current definition of "curtilage," some past Florida decisions have even
held that merely walking up to the door of someone's house with the intent
to break in and commit a crime will be a burglary even if the house's
threshold is not crossed, since the "curtilage" has been entered.84 Recently,
the Supreme Court of Florida settled any question concerning what basic
requirements there are before a particular area can be considered a structure
or a dwelling's "curtilage."
In State v. Hamilton,8 5 Hamilton and an accomplice, Thomas, entered
the yard of a home intending to steal motors from a boat located in the yard.
The homeowner saw the two would-be thieves and confronted them with a
shotgun. Subsequently, the homeowner shot and killed Thomas. Hamilton
was charged with one count of burglary of a dwelling and a second count of
second degree felony murder for the death of his accomplice, Thomas. At
trial, the prosecution presented very little evidence concerning the appear-
ance of the backyard where the motors were located. 6 Hamilton requested
that the trial court give the definition of structure that is found in the Florida
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. Under that definition, a
"structure" is "any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, that
has a roof over it, and the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings
immediately surrounding that structure."87  Despite this request, the trial
court gave a modified instruction that omitted any requirement that the area
beyond the building itself be "enclosed" and which defined "curtilage" as
v. State, 667 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing the defendant's conviction
for disorderly conduct based on his loud cursing in his yard as this occurred in his dwelling
and no facts showed that the language used incited others or posed an imminent danger to
them).
79. See Tobler v. State, 371 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d
76 (Fla. 1979).
80. See T.J.T. v. State, 460 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
81. See Greer v. State, 354 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
82. See State v. Rolle, 577 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
83. See J.E.S. v. State, 453 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Joyner v. State, 303
So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. discharged by 325 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1976).
84. See M.M. v. State, 610 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
85. 660 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1995).
86. The State only presented a photograph showing the place as a "'semi-secluded area
adjacent to the home surrounded by several unevenly spaced trees."' Id. at 1039 n.2 (quoting
State v. Hamilton, 645 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)). Other than this, there
was no evidence that the backyard was enclosed in any matter.
87. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCrIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 136 (1981).
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"the ground and buildings immediately surrounding a structure and dwelling
and customarily used in connection with it."' 88 Following these instructions,
the jury found Hamilton guilty of burglary of a dwelling and second degree
felony murder.
The Second District Court of Appeal89 found the trial court committed
reversible error by deviating from the standard jury instruction on
"structure" by not including in its instructions the requirement that the
"curtilage" be enclosed. 90 The court, however, declined to decide to what
extent the area around a structure must be enclosed before it could be
considered to meet the meaning of "curtilage." Although it reversed Hamil-
ton's convictions for burglary and for second degree felony murder, 91 the
district court certified both of these issues to the Supreme Court of Florida as
questions of great public importance.
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted the certified questions and
affirmed the decision of the second district.92 In so doing, the Hamilton
88. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1039. Both the supreme court and the district court noted
that this definition was based on virtually identical language as that found in A.E.R. v. State,
464 So. 2d 152, 153 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 472 So. 2d 1180 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1011 (1985) (footnote omitted).
89. Hamilton, 645 So. 2d at 556.
90. Both the district court and the supreme court also found that the trial court should
have explained on the record why the standard instruction was not given. The State had
requested the deviation from the standard language, evidently to cure problems with the
deficiency of proof that the yard was within the "curtilage." As the district court noted, the
State's prosecution rested solely on the jury finding that the killing took place during the
commission of a burglary. Without such a finding there would not be any statutorily required
predicate felony for application of the felony murder doctrine. Although Hamilton was
convicted of third degree grand theft, this is not one of the specifically enumerated felonies
under section 782.04 of the Florida Statutes, which can support a felony murder conviction.
See FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1995).
The instruction that the trial court gave was based on the language of another district court
opinion. Thus, the trial court had some basis for its deviation from the standard instruction.
However, this ultimately turned out to be incorrect. Prosecutors and trial judges should
carefully note the second district's admonition in this case that "[p]assages from appellate
opinions, taken out of context, do not always make for good jury instructions." Hamilton, 645
So. 2d at 559 n.5 (quoting Sarduy v. State, 540 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
91. The district court also reduced Hamilton's conviction for grand theft from a second
degree to a third degree felony. Additionally, the district court rejected claims that Hamilton's
motion for judgment for acquittal should have been granted and that the trial court erred by
not instructing the jury on justifiable and excusable homicide. The district court's opinion
does not give any reasons for these rulings.
92. The exact question both certified and accepted is "DOES FLORIDA'S BURGLARY
STATUTE REQUIRE THAT THE 'CURTILAGE' BE ENCLOSED AND, IF SO, TO WHAT
EXTENT?" Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1039.
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opinion provides an organized and thoughtful discussion of the gradual
evolution of burglary law in Florida. Florida's original statutory definition
of burglary was extremely close to the common law definition.93 This
original definition protected mainly dwellings. Any other "building or
structure" 94 was only included within the scope of this original definition if
they were "within the 'curtilage' of a dwelling house though not forming a
part thereof."95 However, this definition was repealed in 1974, and burglary,
as an offense, was expanded to apply to all roofed buildings of any kind.
The current definitions of structure and dwellings both explicitly contain
language making the "curtilage" part of these places. Thus, the present
Florida burglary statute extends protection not only to buildings, but also
potentially to the grounds around them.96 As the Hamilton court succinctly
noted, "[t]he legislature has [therefore] redefined the crime of burglary as it
was treated at common law, but has utilized the common law term 'curtilage'
to expand the reach of the burglary statute beyond buildings and vehicles." 97
Thus, deciding whether a particular locale now comes within the definition
of "curtilage" is of extreme importance for determining potential criminal
liability.
Hamilton began its exploration of what should be considered as the
present appropriate definition of "curtilage" by discussing the earlier
meanings given to this term. The court noted that at common law, the
cluster of buildings and the surrounding ground near the dwelling home
would usually be enclosed in some fashion. At common law, use of the
word "curtilage" with reference to burglary was a way of protecting not only
the dwelling itself but also the buildings and areas so intimately associated
with the dwelling that they were virtually a part of it. The court found that
early treatises and dictionary definitions generally required some sort of
As the second district's opinion recognized, this actually is two questions, not one. The
second district found that beyond requiring that the "curtilage" be enclosed it was hard "to be
more precise given the myriad arrangements an owner can fashion in enclosing ......
Hamilton, 645 So. 2d at 561. The second district thus left the second question unanswered.
Similarly, the supreme court failed to expressly address this second question. Like so many
other factual issues, this second question is likely to be gradually answered on a case-by-case
basis, rather than in one sweeping decision.
93. See 1895 Fla. Laws ch. 4405 (later codified at FLA. STAT. § 810.01 (1941)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The burglary statutes also protect conveyances, but the term "curtilage" is not used in
the definition of "conveyance." Thus, there is presently no such concept as a "curtilage of a
conveyance" for purposes of burglary in Florida.
97. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1041.
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enclosure in order for a place to be considered part of a dwelling's
"curtilage." Hamilton concluded that the term "curtilage" had a rather
precise definition at common law.
The supreme court noted that Florida has expressly incorporated the
common law into its own body of law. 98 Despite this incorporation, Florida
courts have been inconsistent in defining what constitutes a "curtilage."
Hamilton mainly attributed this inconsistency to the different factual and
legal contexts in which the term "curtilage" is used. The court noted that
most district court opinions had construed the term "curtilage" for purposes
of the burglary statute as requiring some sort of enclosure. However, the
same courts have used a different definition when examining the term
"curtilage" for purposes of deciding whether an illegal search and seizure
has taken place. In United States v. Dunn,99 the United States Supreme
Court adopted a four-part test for determining whether a certain location was
a part of a building's "curtilage" when trying to determine if an illegal search
occurred. Whether the area was enclosed within the same immediate area as
a home was only one part of that test.1°° Under the Florida Constitution,
Florida courts are required to interpret the Florida Constitution's prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizures 1 in conformity with the decisions
in the United States Supreme Court construing the Fourth Amendment. In
Hamilton, the Supreme Court of Florida found no inconsistency in using
different tests for determining whether a place was within the "curtilage"
depending upon the legal issue involved.
In addition to noting that Florida's criminal law had expressly incorpo-
rated the common law, Hamilton also found that other basic principles
involving construction of criminal statutes required that the "curtilage," for
purposes of burglary statutes, must mean an enclosed area. First, there is the
principle that citizens must be given ample notice as to which aspect of their
conduct will violate the criminal law. Although ignorance of the law is
generally no defense, a certain amount of notice must be given or else there
will be due process problems.10 2 Second, Florida statutory criminal law
98. See FLA. STAT. § 775.01 (1995).
99. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
100. The other three parts of the test were: (1) the proximity of the area alleged to be
"curtilage" to the dwelling; (2) the nature and use to which this area was put; and (3) the steps
taken to protect the area from observation by passersby. Id. at 301.
101. See FLA. CONST. art I, § 12.
102. Lack of adequate notice brings up questions of vagueness. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 121-54 (discussing additional constitutional issues surrounding potentially vague
criminal statutes).
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expressly provides that criminal statutes should be strictly construed in a
fashion "most favorabl[e] to the accused.' 0 3 Since the supreme court could
not determine whether the legislature intended to adopt the common law
definition of "curtilage" or to eliminate the requirement of enclosure, as
some jurisdictions had, fairness required the current burglary statute to be
interpreted to contain such a requirement. Finally, the supreme court agreed
with the district court's reasoning that to not require some sort of enclosure
could possibly lead to harsh and absurd results.
Hamilton is clearly an important case on construction of the Florida
burglary statute. As a result of Hamilton, the Supreme Court of Florida has
provided a somewhat more precise definition for the concept of
"curtilage. ' 1°4 However, in so doing, the court expressly acknowledged that
the legislature could amend the burglary statutes and give the term
"curtilage" any definition that it believed to be appropriate.'0 5 This could
include eliminating the requirement of an enclosure for certain areas, as had
been done in other jurisdictions. So far, the legislature has not so acted. The
real question facing the legislature is whether it wishes to use the burglary
statute as a means of expanding criminal responsibility and punishment for
offenders who otherwise are breaking the criminal law. Hamilton's facts
provide a classic example of this scenario. Presently, Hamilton could only
be successfully prosecuted for theft.1°6 If the burglary statute is amended to
expand the definition of "curtilage" to include areas close to a dwelling or
structure but not necessarily enclosed, then the two perpetrators would be
guilty of burglary as well. Certainly, if one believes in the deterrent theory
behind criminal law, expanding the definition of "curtilage" to make
Hamilton's act a burglary in addition to maybe a trespass'07 and theft is not
troubling. Theoretically, people would then know that entering another's
103. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (1995).
104. As previously noted, the supreme court only answered one of two questions certified
by the district court. See supra note 92.
105. The legislature has recently amended the definition of "dwelling" to include any
"attached porch" on a building or conveyance that would otherwise qualify as a "dwelling."
See ch. 96-388, § 47, 1996 Fla. Laws 2301, 2337 (amending FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2)
(effective October 1, 1996)). However, so far the legislature has not statutorily defined what
should be considered as "curtilage."
106. Hamilton could probably not be successfully prosecuted for trespass, under section
810.09(1) of the Florida Statutes, unless the homeowner had given the two would-be thieves
actual notice to get off of his property. See FLA. STAT. § 810.09(1) (1995). Even if such
notice had been given here, the trespass would be only a first degree misdemeanor under the
facts given. See id. § 810.09(2)(b).
107. See id.
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property might make them susceptible to harsher punishment. However, the
critical issue behind expanding the definition of "curtilage" for purposes of
the burglary statute is really posed by the felony murder rule. When the
death of someone occurs during certain enumerated felonies, then the
surviving felons are liable for first degree murder under the theory of felony
murder. Unlike some other jurisdictions, which have adopted different
means of abrogating the harshness of the felony murder doctrine, Florida has
adopted a relatively strict and harsh interpretation of this doctrine. 0 8 Thus,
the fact that the killing in this particular case was not done by one of the
felons, or that the person killed was a co-felon, 10 9 would not make a differ-
ence in applying the felony murder doctrine to Hamilton. Whether the
Florida Legislature wishes to achieve such a result should be one of the
prime concerns in considering whether "curtilage" should be legislatively
defined to abrogate the result reached in Hamilton."°
E. Attempted Murder of a Law Enforcement Officer
Florida criminal law punishes attempted as well as completed crimes.
The rationale for so doing that a person who possesses the requisite intent to
108. The Florida Legislature could have adopted an even harsher version of the felony
murder rule. Florida currently applies the felony murder rule only to a certain number of
specifically enumerated felonies. The harshest version of the felony murder doctrine would be
to apply it to all statutory felonies.
The felony murder rule's harshness may also be alleviated by applying the independent act
doctrine. Generally, felons are responsible for all killings committed by their accomplices
during the course of the underlying felony. However, when a co-felon's homicidal act so
deviates from the original plan and does not further the commission of the felony, it will not
be attributed to the other co-felons. Obviously whether such a deviation exists must be
determined under the particular facts of each case. For a recent case discussing this doctrine,
see Dell v. State, 661 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), which found no error in the
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury about the independent act doctrine and discussed
situations where such an instruction would be appropriate.
109. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (1965) (reversing defendant's conviction
for felony murder where his accomplice was killed by the victim during a robbery).
110. The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases has
proposed the following new definition for "[d]welling" in section 810.02: "'Dwelling"'
means a building [or] [conveyance] of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or
immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at
night, together with enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding it."
Proposed Standard Jury Instruction Amendments, FLA. BAR NEws, Aug. 1, 1996, at 14.
There is no indication in the published version of the new instruction that it was proposed
in response to Hamilton. If this is indeed the reason, one would also expect a new instruction
for "structure."
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commit a criminal act and takes some steps toward the completion of this
criminal act poses a sufficient threat to society for the criminal law to
intervene. Generally, attempted crimes are punished to a lesser degree than
completed crimes.' There are two justifications for such difference in
punishment. First, since the criminal object was not actually obtained,
generally punishing an attempted crime to the same extent as a completed
crime would pose problems of disproportionality. Second, and perhaps more
important, punishing attempts to a lesser degree than the completed offense
provides an incentive for a perpetrator to abandon his or her criminal scheme
before attaining its completion.
During this past year, the Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. Iaco-
vone,112 addressed challenges to the former sentencing schemes for the
offense of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer. lacovone became
involved in a violent domestic dispute with his former girlfriend who also
happened to be the mother of their three children. When a police officer
tried to intervene, lacovone tried to flee in his car. During his escape
attempt, lacovone struck the officer with the car. Jacovone was subsequently
tried and convicted of several offenses," 3 including attempted third degree
murder of a law enforcement officer. Under the general statutory provisions
for third degree murder and for attempt crimes, third degree murder would
have been considered a second degree felony" 4 and would be punished as a
third degree felony. 115 However, since the attempted murder here involved a
crime against a police officer, special statutory sections regarding punish-
ment applied. Former sections 775.0823, 775.0825, and 784.07 of the
Florida Statutes attempted to provide increased protection to Florida law
111. Section 777.04(4)(d) of the Florida Statutes lists several exceptions to this principle.
FLA. STAT. § 777.04(4)(d) (1995). Where an attempted crime is punished to the same degree
as the completed offense, the attempted crime is not considered a lesser included offense of
the completed crime. In such a situation, it is error to instruct a jury on both the completed
offense and the attempted offense. See Nurse v. State, 658 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1995), review denied, 667 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1996) (finding that the trial court committed
reversible error by instructing the jury on attempted burglary of a dwelling as well as burglary
of a dwelling, both of which were punishable as third degree felonies under the facts). Nurse
contains an excellent, extensive discussion on what are necessary lesser included and
permissive included offenses under current Florida criminal law.
112. 660 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1995).
113. The other offenses were burglary, criminal mischief, aggravated assault, and aggra-
vated battery. None of these offense convictions are pertinent to the issue discussed in the
appellate decision in this case.
114. See FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1991).
115. See id. § 777.04(4)(c) (1991).
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enforcement officers and other law enforcement officers acting within the
course of their duties by providing increased penalties for certain offenses
committed against them. The obvious purpose of these sections is to deter
the commission of such offenses against law enforcement officers.
In his appeal, lacovone challenged the constitutionality and rationality
of these former sentencing provisions. Under former section 775.0823(3), a
person convicted of third degree murder of a law enforcement officer would
have received a sentence of fifteen years with a fifteen year mandatory
minimum. However, former section 784.07(3) contained a special sentenc-
ing provision for attempted murder of law enforcement officers. This
section made all attempted murders of law enforcement officers life felonies.
Additionally, former section 775.0825 made anyone convicted of the
attempted murder of a law enforcement officer ineligible for parole until
twenty-five years incarceration have been served. If read literally, an
accused would actually receive less punishment for the completed third
degree murder of a law enforcement officer than for an attempted murder.
Iacovone claimed that the special offense classification and sentencing
provisions of former sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Second District Court of Appeal1 6 recognized the legislature's
general power to fix the offense classifications and to determine the punish-
ment for these offenses. Additionally, the court acknowledged the general
rule that "[s]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional.""17 However, in this
case, these two principles were insufficient to uphold the constitutionality of
the sections involved. The district court noted that traditional equal protec-
tion analysis did not apply here," 8 but found that "irrational [offense and
sentencing] classifications may violate fundamental constitutional princi-
ples ... ,, 19 Protecting law enforcement officers in the performance of their
duties was certainly a valid legislative goal. However, punishing some
attempted murders of law enforcement officers more harshly than completed
murders of the same personnel did not further that goal. Indeed, such a
punishment scheme would actually be inconsistent with the furtherance of
that goal. Thus, the second district found that the statutory sections would
116. Iacovone v. State, 639 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
117. Id. at 1109 (citing State v. Wilson, 464 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
118. The court reasoned that this was because people charged with an attempted murder
and those charged with a completed murder are "not similarly situated because they are
charged with different offenses." Id.
119. Id.
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be unconstitutional as applied due to the irrational results that they would
cause.
Although the Supreme Court of Florida arrived at the same ultimate
conclusion as the district court, it did so for different reasons. The supreme
court avoided reaching the constitutional issue addressed below. Instead, the
court relied on standard principles of statutory construction. Two such
principles are that courts must construe statutes to effectuate the legislative
intent behind their passage. However, statutes should not be read literally, if
doing so would lead to results conflicting with their purpose. Here, the court
found that "[t]he legislature unquestionably intends to give law enforcement
officers the greatest possible protection."' 12° This object would not be
attained by applying former sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 to all degrees
of murder. 121 If applied to all degrees of murder, a would-be killer would
actually be sometimes better off as far as punishment if his victim was killed
rather than if the victim survived. As the court noted, this "would seem to
encourage, not discourage, lethal attacks."'122 However, if these sections
were applied only to first degree murder, then their application would be
rational because the penalty for an attempted first degree murder of a law
enforcement would still be less than that for the completed act although both
would be enhanced. Thus, the court held that former "sections 784.07(3)
and 775.0825 apply only to first-degree murder."'
' 2
The long range effect of the supreme court's holding in Iacovone is not
likely to be significant. The legislature has already repealed both former
sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825. Penalties for violent crimes against law
enforcement officers are still enhanced under sections 775.0823 and 784.07.
All degrees of both attempted and completed murders of law enforcement
officers are now punished under the Florida sentencing guidelines, with the
exception of first degree murder. However, the significance of the court's
reasoning in Iacovone should apply to all offense classification and punish-
ment. Both the district and supreme court opinions require rationality in
criminal statutes. When such rationality does not exist on the face of a
statute, the statute will either be construed in a way such that rationality can
be provided or it will be declared invalid. Indeed, literally applying these
former sections would have been inconsistent with the general principles
behind punishment. One goal of punishment is deterrence. The theory
120. State v. Iacovone, 660 So. 2d 1371, 1373 (Fla. 1995).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id at 1374.
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behind this is that the potentially higher the punishment the less incentive
there is to commit the forbidden act. Here, as both courts recognized, literal
application of these sections would actually have provided a disincentive to
desist, rather than an incentive to desist. Another theory behind punishment
is retribution. However, one principle of retribution is proportionality.
Under this principle, commonly stated as "let the punishment fit the crime,"
vastly disproportionate sentences for virtually the same acts should not exist,
and when they do so, such disproportionality must be strictly justified. As
no such justification existed for the sections in question in Iacovone, the
supreme court really had no choice but to either find them unconstitutional
or construe them in a way to avoid reaching a disproportionate and absurd
result.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FLORIDA CRIMINAL LAWS
A. Vagueness
Due process challenges to Florida criminal statutes based upon alleg-
edly vague language continue to concern the Supreme Court of Florida.
Criminal statutes must give a reasonable person sufficient notice of what
conduct is likely to be proscribed for a number of reasons. First, the crimi-
nal law expects that every citizen will conform his or her conduct so as to
avoid violating the law. Without knowing exactly what conduct violates the
law, reasonable people cannot possibly be expected to govern their actions
accordingly. Second, vague statutes allow the police undue freedom to
interpret what actions violate the law. This potentially allows the police to
arrest, search, and charge citizens in an inconsistent and potentially dis-
criminatory manner. Third, if the statute is so vague that the conduct which
violates it is unclear, citizens can find themselves being charged at the whim
of a prosecutor. Fourth, citizens fearing potential imposition of criminal
sanctions may forego the valid exercise of their constitutional rights rather
than risk arrest and/or conviction. Finally, without sufficient standards as to
what conduct violates a statute, jury decision making as to when individuals
are guilty of violating the criminal law is not likely to be sufficiently
consistent to merit public confidence. Thus, unconstitutionally vague
statutes are general risks to the rights of individual citizens and to the
confidence of the general public in the criminal justice system. Individual
[Vol. 2 1: 101
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Supreme Court of Florida cases addressing challenges to Florida criminal
statutes based on vagueness are discussed below. 124
1. Negligent Treatment of Children
In State v. Mincey,125 the Supreme Court of Florida considered argu-
ments that Florida Statute section 827.05 concerning negligent treatment of
children was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. The state charged
Mincey under the negligent treatment statute after his five-year-old stepson
was found wandering the streets late at night clad only in pajamas. This
charge was based purely on simple negligent conduct. Mincey moved to
dismiss the charges claiming that section 827.05 was unconstitutionally
vague. The county court agreed and certified its decision to the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, which likewise found section 827.05 constitution-
ally deficient. 26  However, the Supreme Court of Florida accepted the
124. In addition to the recent Supreme Court of Florida cases discussing the void for
vagueness doctrine, a number of district court of appeal decisions dealt with this topic.
During the last two survey periods, vagueness was the most frequently raised basis for
constitutional challenges to Florida criminal laws. The relatively large number of cases
raising vagueness challenges suggest that this will continue to be the one of the most, if not
the most, popular grounds on which to attack criminal statutes. For further general discussion
on the void for vagueness doctrine, see LAFAVE & Scorr, CRIINAL LAW 2.3 (2d ed. 1986).
For district court of appeal decisions during this survey period raising vagueness chal-
lenges to Florida Statutes, see Morey's Lounge, Inc. v. State of Florida, Dept. of Business and
Professional, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 673 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No, 88,240, 1996 LEXIS 1723, at *1 (Fla. Sept. 18, 1996)
(upholding the constitutionality of section 561.29(1)(a) which allows the Department to
suspend or revoke a beverage license for violation of "any of the laws of this or of the United
States") (quoting Florida Bar v. Dubow, 636 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1994)). See also Jennings v.
State, 667 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 676 So. 2d 1368 (Fla.
1996) (finding that the words "12 A.M." in section 893.13(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes,
increasing the penalty for selling narcotics near a school during certain hours, were not
unconstitutionally vague); Falco v. State, 669 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 672 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1996) (finding that the term "custodial authority" in
section 794.041(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes, criminalizing sexual activity by a person in
custodial authority with a child, was not vague); and Quinn v. State, 662 So. 2d 947, 949 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of section 337.135 of the Florida
Statutes, under which it is a second degree felony, to "fraudulently represent an entity as a
socially and economically disadvantaged business enterprise" to qualify for certification under
a Department of Transportation program to assist such businesses in obtaining contracts)
(quoting FLA. STAT. § 337.135 (1989)).
125. 672 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1996).
126. State v. Mincey, 658 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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certified question concerning validity of section 827.05127 from the district
court's decision.
Florida Statute section 827.05 makes it a second degree misdemeanor
for a person "though financially able" to "negligently deprive a child" of the
necessities of life when such deprivation either significantly impairs the
child's physical or emotional health or significantly endangers it.128 This
section is not Florida's first attempt to criminalize the negligent treatment of
children. Former section 827.05 of the Florida Statutes had made it a
second degree misdemeanor to "negligently depriv[e] a child of, or allo[w] a
child to be deprived of' necessities. However, this statute had not passed
constitutional muster. In State v. Winters,'29 the supreme court found this
language constitutionally deficient because the statutory language evidently
punished simple negligent conduct without any showing of willfulness.
After Winters, the legislature amended section 827.05 to add the words
"though financially able" and additional language of causation which would
link the alleged deprivation to the danger of harm.130 Besides former section
827.05, Florida also at the same time had a general child abuse statute,
former section 827.042, which made it a crime to "wilfully or by culpable
negligence" deprive a child of life's necessities when doing so either caused
the child's "physical or mental health ... to be endangered."' 31 The year
after Winters, in State v. Joyce, 32 the defendants attempted to convince the
Supreme Court of Florida that the general criminal child abuse statute,
127. The exact question accepted by the supreme court is as follows:
WHETHER THE ADDITION OF LANGUAGE ADDRESSING FINANCIAL
ABILITY AND A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEN THE RESIDENTIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND SIGNIFICANT IMPAIRMENT OF THE CHILD'S
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HEALTH IN SECTION 827.05 AMOUNTS
TO A WILLFUL INTENT OR SCIENTER REQUIREMENT SUFFICIENT TO
OVERCOME THE HOLDING IN WINTERS.
Mincey, 672 So. 2d at 525 (footnote omitted).
128. See FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1995).
129. 346 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1977).
130. The additional causation language in revised section 827.05 which was added to the
end of the former statute provides: "when such deprivation ... causes the child's physical or
emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly
impaired ...." FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1995).
131. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1975). Section 827.04 has since been amended to prohibit
depriving a child of necessities when such deprivation "inflicts or permits the infliction of
physical or mental injury to the child." FLA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1995). Depending upon the
degree or duration of the injury, the crime will be either a third degree felony under 827.04(1),
or a first degree misdemeanor under 827.04(2).
132. 361 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978).
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former section 827.04, was unconstitutional for the same reasons that former
section 827.05 had been found deficient. However, the supreme court
rejected this argument and distinguished the two. Joyce noted that the basis
for holding former section 827.05 unconstitutional in Winters was that "the
negligent treatment statute [827.05] made criminal acts of simple negli-
gence-conduct which was neither willful nor culpably negligent."' 33 Since
former section 827.04(2) had a requirement of willfulness or culpable
negligence, the deficiency present in former section 827.05 was not present
with the statute in Joyce.
In Mincey, both the fourth district and the supreme court noted the
different results reached on the vagueness challenges in Winters and Joyce.
Both courts also noted that the only difference between former section
827.05 and the present version was the additional statutory language relating
to causation and the offender's financial ability. The district court found
that the addition of this language did not "address the lack of willfulness,
scienter, or mens rea,"'134 and thus did not cure the defect in former section
827.05. The Supreme Court of Florida arrived at the same result, finding
that the addition of the new statutory language "does not clarify the type of
conduct that is prohibited under the statute."'135 Thus, the Mincey court held
that the new language did not correct the vagueness problems recognized in
earlier decisions and found section 827.05 unconstitutionally vague.
Mincey is an interesting decision because it may have arrived at the
right result for the wrong reason. Arguably, section 827.05 does have a
mens rea requirement in it. If so, then how could it be considered vague?
The statute explicitly contemplates a person who "negligently deprives a
child." 36 The type of conduct involved here seems to involve negligence.
Certainly the language found constitutional in section 827.04 requiring
willfulness explicitly requires a much higher mens rea than negligence.'
37
133. Id. at 407.
134. Mincey, 658 So. 2d at 598.
135. Mincey, 672 So. 2d at 526.
136. See FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1995).
137. "Willfulness" generally requires an act as opposed to a failure to act. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 202(8) (providing that "[a] requirement that an offense be committed
wilfully if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless
a purpose to impose further requirements appears."). Under a "negligence" standard, deciding
whether a person has acted or failed to act may not be as easy as it seems. For example, did
Mincey act negligently by affirmatively allowing his child to wander the streets or did he "act"
negligently by not preventing his child from wandering the streets?
The Supreme Court of Florida in Winters recognized that negligence can arise from both
action or inaction. As the court noted in Winters, "[n]egligence may consist either in doing
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On the other hand, section 827.04 also criminalizes "culpable negligence" in
addition to willfulness.' 38  But when one looks at how the Florida courts
have defined "culpable negligence,"' 139 it is clear that this is the equivalent or
virtually the equivalent of what would be considered "recklessly" by some
criminal codes.1
40
Mincey and the court's previous decision in Winters therefore seem to
stand for the simple proposition that statutes which criminalize simple
negligent conduct will not pass constitutional muster.1 4' Section 827.04
already criminalizes willful child abuse. Thus, persons who willfully harm
children can be punished under that statute. The same statutory section also
punishes what would be considered "culpable negligence." Those individu-
als exhibiting a high degree of lack of care for children can likewise be
prosecuted. One of the purposes of the criminal law is to clarify what
conduct will subject someone to criminal liability. If a statute makes it too
easy to subject someone to criminal liability, then there is the problem that
something that a reasonabl[e] ... person would not do ... or in failing to do something that a
reasonabl[e]... person would do under like circumstances." Winters, 346 So. 2d at 993.
138. See FLA. STAT. § 827.04(l)-(2).
139. For example, in Hodges v. State, 661 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995),
review denied, 670 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 1996), the court mentioned that the culpable negligence
needed for a manslaughter would have to be "of a gross and flagrant character, evincing
reckless disregard of human life ... or that reckless indifference to the rights of others, which
is equivalent to an intentional violation of them." Id. at 109 n.2 (emphasis added).
140. The Model Penal Code defines the culpability level of "Recklessly" as "consciously
disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk...." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
The disregard of the risk involved must be "a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation." Id.
Under the Model Penal Code, there are four levels of culpability or mens rea that can
support a criminal charge depending upon the wording of the statute involved: purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. See id. § 2.02(2). The first three levels of culpability
reflect some level of awareness of the conduct the defendant is accused of doing. Id. §
2.02(2)(a)-(c). Negligently, the fourth and lowest level of culpability, does not reflect a level
of awareness and is only sufficient to support a conviction in rare circumstances. Id. §
2.02(d).
141. The only other case during this survey period which discussed section 827.05 also
found it unconstitutional. See State v. Ayers, 665 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995),
aft'd, 673 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1996). However, Ayers noted in its opinion that child abuse
statutes from several other states that had negligence as one of the levels of culpability had
been upheld against vagueness attacks. Id. at 298. Ayers also noted that at one time certain
acts of negligence, such as careless driving, had been punished criminally. Id. at 299.
Neither the district court nor the supreme court in Mincey make any mention of these other
state statutes which appear to prohibit much the same conduct prohibited by section 827.05.
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virtually anybody can be held liable. 142 The facts in Mincey are a good
example. Although one would surely not want to have a five-year-old
wandering the streets at night (whether clad only in pajamas or fully
dressed), charging somebody with a second degree misdemeanor for one
simple act of negligence for allowing such a thing to happen seems a little
severe. Many parents, at one time or another, probably do something that
negligently expose their child to danger. Luckily, the vast majority of
parents hardly ever do this, and luckily most children are not hurt despite
being exposed to such dangers. Furthermore, parents who consistently
negligently fail to care for their children are subject to state intervention
under statutes other than those for criminal offenses. The decisions in
Mincey, Winters, and Joyce show that these statutes are probably the
appropriate avenue to pursue when parents engage in simple negligence with
regards to their children.
2. Bribery
In Roque v. State,143 the Supreme Court of Florida sustained a vague-
ness challenge to section 838.15 of the Florida Statutes, which created the
crime of commercial bribe receiving. This statute made it a third degree
felony' 44 for a person to "solicit[], accept[], or agree[] to accept a benefit
with intent to violate a statutory or common-law duty"'145 which that person
owes another in a certain capacity. 146 Part of Roque's job as a company
credit manager was to extend credit to companies seeking to finance con-
struction equipment. Roque worked with Mr. Smith, an independent
contractor, who located suitable candidates for loans from Roque's com-
pany. Smith, as an independent contractor, was paid by commission. The
state charged Roque with entering into an unauthorized side agreement
142. The language in section 827.05 actually would pose this very problem if construed
literally. This section is not limited to parents or those in a caretaking posture towards
children. Instead, section 827.05 applies to whoever "is financially able." FLA. STAT. §
827.05 (1995). Thus, one must ask if a millionaire who knows that children are starving and
neglects to donate some money to see that the starving children are fed would be prosecutable.
Since the purpose of the criminal statute is to not only specify what acts are prohibited but
also to clarify who may be criminally responsible for acting or falling to act under certain
circumstances, then arguably section 827.05 could have been declared vague because by
making so many persons potentially responsible, it falls to give the notice which due process
of law requires.
143. 664 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1995).
144. FLA. STAT. § 838.15(2) (1995).
145. Id. § 838.15(1).
146. Id. § 838.15(1)(a)-(e).
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whereby Smith kicked back to Roque part of each commission he received
for finding a suitable candidate. At the trial court level, Roque successfully
moved to dismiss the commercial bribery charges against him, claiming that
section 838.15 was unconstitutionally vague and susceptible to arbitrary
application. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and found section
838.15 to be constitutional. 47 The district court found that there are two
separate questions under a vagueness challenge. The first was whether "the
statute [in question] gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what constitutes [the] forbidden conduct."'148 Second, a challenged statute
had to be "specific enough that it is not susceptible to arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement."'' 49 Roque claimed that the inclusion of the words "with
intent to violate a statutory or common law duty" made section 838.15
unconstitutionally vague.' 50  The district court of appeal rejected this
argument for two reasons. This statutory language was found to be specific
enough by its reference to the professional or legal relationships specified
elsewhere in the statute. The court found that "[a] person who fits into one
or more of these categories is certainly aware of the duties which are
commensurate with that station."' 51 The use of the word "bribe" also helped
indicate the nature of the prohibited conduct. When given its common
meaning, this word sufficiently conveyed such notice that a person with
reasonable intelligence would understand what conduct section 838.15
prohibited. The district court then turned to the second question of the
vagueness analysis; whether the statute is susceptible to arbitrary enforce-
ment, and it answered in the negative. Since the word "commercial"
modified the words "bribe receiving" in the title of section 838.15 and in its
definitional section, the statute by its language only applied to private
industry and commercial transactions, not to public officials. Additionally,
the court found that the specific professions and relationships enumerated in
the statute served to limit the amount of prosecutorial discretion in charging
violations of section 838.15.
The district court's opinion had briefly noted the Supreme Court of
Florida's previous discussion of the void for vagueness doctrine in its
147. State v. Roque, 640 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 650 So.
2d 991 (Fla. 1995).
148. Id. at 99 (quoting Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. 1994)).
149. IM
150. FLA. STAT. § 838.15(1).
151. Roque, 640 So. 2d at 99. See also FLA. STAT. § 838.15(1).
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relatively recent decision in Cuda v. State152 which contrasted the different
results in two other previous decisions. The Cuda court found that former
section 415.111(5) of the Florida Statutes, which made it a third degree
felony for anyone to exploit an aged or disabled adult "by the improper or
illegal use or management"'153 of such person's property was unconstitution-
ally vague. 54 In this case, the supreme court had focused on the words
"improper" and "illegal" in finding this section unconstitutional. In so
doing, the court had contrasted Cuda with its decision in two earlier cases,
one holding a statute unconstitutionally vague and the other upholding a
statute against such a challenge. In State v. Rodriguez,155 the court had
upheld former section 409.325(2)(a)'56 of the Florida Statutes, which
criminalized certain acts regarding food stamps when the acts done were
"not authorized by law."'157 Rodriguez found that because of the program's
peculiar nature and because chapter 409 itself gave notice that there were
federal regulations governing the program, these words actually meant "not
authorized by state and federal food stamp law."' 58 Thus, when the section
being challenged was read in conjunction with the remainder of the chapter,
constitutional notice problems were satisfied. Contrary to its decision in
Rodriguez, in Locklin v. Pridgeon,I5 9 the supreme court had struck down a
statute containing the exact same language. Former section 839.22 of the
Florida Statutes made it unlawful for any government officer to "commit
any act under color of authority ... when such act is not authorized by
law .... 160 This statute was considered unconstitutionally vague because it
required every governmental employee to determine what acts were author-
ized by law and what acts were not authorized by law. The "law" in Locklin
was not limited to a narrow area like the "law" in Rodriguez. Thus, the term
"law" could mean any and all laws, civil or criminal. A person could never
know how to govern their conduct to avoid violating the section without
152. 639 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1994). For extensive discussion about this decision, see Mark
M. Dobson, Criminal Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REv. 67, 104-08
(1995).
153. FLA. STAT. § 415.111(5) (1993).
154. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 25.
155. 365 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1978).
156. Section 409.325(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes contains this challenged statutory
language. See FLA. STAT. § 409.325(2)(a) (1995).
157. Rodriguez, 365 So. 2d at 159.
158. Id.
159. 30 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 1947).
160. FLA. STAT. § 839.22 (1945).
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having an all-encompassing knowledge of all law--something which was
definitely an impossible task. The third district in Roque had found that
section 838.15 was more like the statute found constitutional in Rodriguez
than the ones declared invalid in Cuda and Locklin. Since section 838.18
specifically referred to certain professional relationships that the appropriate
statutory and common law applied to, the district court determined this gave
sufficient notice of the law which a person must avoid to not violate section
838.15.
When it came time for the Supreme Court of Florida to adjudicate the
constitutionality of section 838.15, it was not so generous, nor detailed in its
analysis. The supreme court focused on the statutory language "common
law duty" in finding section 838.15 unconstitutionally vague. The court felt
that few people would be aware that they owed such a "common duty" to
their employers and that fewer still could define the duty's dimensions. In
order to do so Roque found that "substantial legal research would be re-
quired by many employees to determine their obligations under the law.'
16 1
Therefore, the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Additionally, the court
found that the statute could be susceptible to arbitrary applications. Since
section 838.15 prescribed the violation of every statutory or common law
duty many acts could be prosecuted, according to the court, "no matter how
trivial or obscure, whether it results in harm or not."'1 62 Thus, individual
prosecutors must decide, based on their own subjective opinion, which
violations are sufficiently substantial to warrant criminal prosecution. The
statute considered in Roque therefore failed the second part of the vagueness
analysis described in the district court's opinion.
The Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in Roque is important for
several reasons. First, besides invalidating section 838.15, Roque also calls
into question the constitutionality of section 838.16, titled "Commercial
bribery." 163 Section 838.16 defines the crime of commercial bribery as
"knowing that another is subject to a duty described in s. 838.15(1) and with
intent to influence the other person to violate that duty .. ."164 the offender
gives that person a benefit. If Roque found that a person receiving a com-
mercial bribe could not possibly know which acts "violate a statutory or
common-law duty" under section 838.15(1) then logically a person charged
161. Roque, 664 So. 2d at 929.
162. Id. at 930.
163. See FLA. STAT. § 838.16 (1995).
164. Id. § 838.16(1).
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with making a commercial bribe would not know the same thing.165 Thus, it
is hard to see how section 838.16(1) could be considered constitutional if the
language that it refers to was found deficient in Roque. Roque is also
important because it indicates that the Supreme Court of Florida is not
disposed to uphold the constitutionality of statutes containing language
which criminalizes the violation of certain legal duties when those duties are
broadly defined. If it wishes to criminalize conduct similar to that pro-
scribed in sections 838.15 and 838.16 perhaps the best approach that the
legislature could undertake is the approach suggested by the decision in
Cuda. There the court had discussed a similar statute from another state
which imposed criminal sanctions for financial exploitation of the elderly
that had been upheld against challenges for vagueness. As noted in Cuda,
the Illinois statute the supreme court cited with approval was quite specific
in describing the conduct prohibited. Unfortunately in Roque, the supreme
court did not give any examples of commercial bribery statutes from other
jurisdictions which had been upheld against vagueness attacks. Perhaps, if
the legislature could find statutes from other states which contain more
specific language than that found in sections 838.15 and 838.16, these would
be more likely to be upheld.
B. Overbreadth
1. Stalking
Several recently decided Supreme Court of Florida cases considered
challenges to criminal statutes on the grounds that they were both vague and
overbroad. Bouters v. State166 presented such challenges to the constitution-
ality of the Florida Stalking Law, which is codified at section 784.048 of the
Florida Statutes.167 This section actually contains three separate offenses.
Under subsection (2), anyone who "wilfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows or harasses another person" is guilty of stalking, a first degree
misdemeanor. 168 Under subsection (3), any person who does the same things
and additionally "makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person
[the victim] in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury" is guilty of aggra-
vated stalking, a third degree felony. 169 Finally, under subsection (4),
165. Id. § 838.15(1).
166. 659 So. 2d 235 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 245 (1995).
167. FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (1995).
168. Id. § 784.048(2).
169. Id. § 748.048(3).
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anyone who engages in similar conduct after the person being harassed or
followed has attained an injunction against this activity also commits
aggravated stalking, again a third degree felony. 70 The terms "harasses,"
"course of conduct," and "credible threat" are all defined in subsection (1) of
the statute.' 7 '
Bouters had been charged with aggravated stalking under subsection (4)
due to a series of alleged acts against his former girlfriend. The former
girlfriend filed a complaint with the police alleging that Bouters had been
calling her several times daily causing emotional distress and that he had
beaten her in the past and threatened to kill her. The girlfriend had obtained
a domestic violence injunction against Bouters, but that evidently did no
good as the defendant had allegedly entered her home without permission
but left when the victim called the police. The victim claimed that she
believed that Bouters would have hit her if she had not been on the phone
with the sheriffs office and that she was in fear for her safety as well as her
life due to his actions against her. At the trial level, Bouters moved to
dismiss the charges contending that section 784.048(4) was facially uncon-
stitutional due to vagueness and overbreadth. When that motion was
unsuccessful, Bouters pled nolo contendere and then filed an appeal. In a
short opinion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal 72 upheld the constitution-
ality of section 784.048. The Supreme Court of Florida, in a short but
important opinion, laid to rest any questions about the constitutionality of
this criminal law.
The Supreme Court of Florida turned to United States Supreme Court
decisions for the procedure to use in analyzing overbreadth and vagueness
challenges to the facial validity of section 748.084. Under the procedure laid
down by the United States Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 7 3 when such a challenge is brought, a court
must first "determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct."' 74 If it does not, then the overbreadth
challenge must be rejected. Following this analysis, the reviewing court
should examine whether the challenged statute is facially vague. According
to the Village of Hoffman Estates test, "assuming the enactment implicates
170. Id. § 748.048(4).
171. Id. § 748.048(1).
172. See Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
173. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
174. Id. at 494 (footnote omitted).
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no constitutionally protected conduct," 175 the statute should be declared
unconstitutional due to facial vagueness "only if the enactment is impermis-
sibly vague in all of its applications."' 176 The Supreme Court of Florida
followed this two-step procedure and first examined whether section
784.048 was overbroad due to its interference with either Bouters's own
First Amendment rights or the First Amendment rights of others. Bouters
contended that under this section an arrest could occur if he engaged in
almost any "emotionally charged activity."'77 In his view, as long as the
complaining victim and a law enforcement officer both agreed that the
activity engaged in served no legitimate purpose and that the person com-
plaining to the police showed substantial emotional distress, someone could
be arrested for such constitutionally protected activities, such as political
protest or investigative reporting. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected
this argument, finding that "[s]talking, whether by word or deed, falls
outside the First Amendment's purview."' 178 Section 784.048 proscribed a
certain type of criminal activity which was particularly described in the
statute. This conduct had to be malicious, repeated and designed to cause a
reasonable person distress. Furthermore, the supreme court noted that under
the definition of "harasses,"'179 the conduct must "serve[] no legitimate
purpose" and that under the definition of "course of conduct,"' 80 constitu-
tionally-protected activity was explicitly excluded from the statute's cover-
age. The court recognized that the First Amendment gives a citizen the right
to express himself or herself. However, this does not give one the right to
engage in conduct which jeopardizes the health and safety of others. In this
particular case, the supreme court found that Bouters had indeed allegedly
engaged in this type of behavior. Bouters allegedly repeatedly threatened to
kill his former girlfriend, and his threats were deemed credible as he had
battered her before. Finally, Bouters allegedly violated the domestic
violence injunction by entering the victim's home and leaving only when he
believed law enforcement authorities would arrive. Thus, the conduct that
Bouters engaged in was not constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court of Florida likewise had no difficulty in rejecting
Bouter's claim that section 784.048 was facially vague. To sustain such a
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Bouters, 659 So. 2d at 237.
178. Id.
179. See FLA. STAT. § 784.048(1)(a).
180. See id. § 784.048(1)(b) (Supp. 1992).
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claim, Bouters had to show that "the law [was] impermissibly vague in all its
applications"'181 and thus vagueness could occur only if the prohibitions of a
statute were not clearly defined. With regard to section 784.048, Bouters
claimed the statutory definition of "harasses" was unconstitutionally vague.
Under that definition, "harasses" meant "to engage in a course of conduct
directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in
such person and serves no legitimate purpose."'' 82 The defendant claimed
that this definition created a subjective standard for "substantial emotional
distress" and that someone who was unduly sensitive could suffer such
distress from what would be entirely innocent and permissible contact. If
this was so, and if the party causing the distress could be criminally charged,
then the average citizen could never be sure that any of his or her conduct
towards another person could not end up subjecting the citizen to the reach
of section 784.048.
The Supreme Court of Florida had no problem rejecting such a claim.
According to the court's analysis, the stalking statute was analogous to the
criminal assault statute. Under the criminal assault statute, the well-founded
fear necessary to be caused by another person was measured by the reason-
able person standard rather than a subjective standard. Here the same
principle was found to apply to the stalking statute. If the conduct was such
that it would cause substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person,
then it would violate section 784.048. Conduct causing substantial emo-
tional distress in another person but which would not have caused such in a
reasonable person would not come within the purview of section 784.048.
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected both attacks on the stalking
law's constitutionality.
2. Cross Burning
Florida's criminal "cross burning" statute also came under constitu-
tional attack under this survey period. Section 876.18 of the Florida Statutes
makes it a first degree misdemeanor "to place ... on the property of another
... a burning or flaming cross or any manner of exhibit in which [such a
cross] is a whole or part without first obtaining written permission of the
owner or occupier of the premises to do so. ''183 In State v. T.B.D.,' 84 the
181. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497
(1982).
182. FLA. STAT. § 784.048(l)(a) (1995).
183. Id. § 876.18 (1995).
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State charged a minor with erecting a flaming cross on another's property in
violation of this section. However, the trial court found that this section was
unconstitutional, because it infringed upon protected First Amendment
rights. The First District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's ruling
and held that section 876.18 "criminalizes a substantial amount of expres-
sion protected by the First Amendment and is, therefore, overbroad."' 8 5 The
district court first found that since the activity prohibited by section 876.18
was undoubtedly a form of expressive conduct, this conduct fell within the
purview of the First Amendment's protection. While the district court
recognized that the state has more leeway to restrict expressive conduct than
merely written or spoken expression, the court noted that the state cannot do
so because of the content of the message to be conveyed. Thus, although the
message behind placing a flaming cross in another's property was reprehen-
sible, this conduct still implicated protected First Amendment concerns,
making section 876.18 subject to particularly close scrutiny. United States
Supreme Court decisions have decreed that when conduct and not speech is
involved "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial
as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."186
Applying this test to section 876.18, the district court concluded that the
overbreadth here was both "real" and "substantial." The expressive conduct
prohibited here could not be considered limited to "fighting words," words
which by their very utterance tend to inflict injury and/or incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace. Although the conduct here and the message it
conveyed might be reprehensible, the government was still not free to
prohibit such activities merely because of its offensive nature. 187 The district
court also concluded that even if section 876.18 could be narrowly construed
and was limited only to fighting words, it would still have to be found
unconstitutional for several reasons. First, the court found that the section
184. 638 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 656 So. 2d
479 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
185. Id. at 166.
186. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
187. The district court's opinion gives one example of how the court believed the state
could end up using section 876.18 to suppress prosecution conduct, which although offensive,
was still protected by the First Amendment. The court posited the situation where the Ku
Klux Klan erected a flaming cross on one of its member's property but failed to "first obtain[ ]
written permission of the owner." T.B.D., 638 So. 2d at 168 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 876.18).
The owner might have even been happy to see the cross go up and might orally have
consented to having it on the property. However, if read and enforced as literally written,
such conduct would violate section 876.18 and make those who put up the cross subject to
prosecution.
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proscribed only one type of conduct based upon the content of the message
expressed. Second, such conduct discrimination was not necessary in order
to further the legitimate interests which the statute sought to promote. 88 On
this basis, the first district upheld the constitutional challenge to section
876.18.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in a relatively short opinion, given the
questions involved, disagreed with the district court's analysis and found
that section 876.18 passed constitutional muster. 89 The supreme court
recognized that under the First Amendment "[c]ontent-based restrictions are
presumptively invalid."''9 However, one exception to this general principle
is where the speech or conduct was of such slight social value that it is
outweighed by "the social interest in order and morality."' 9' Three examples
of this exception are: 1) defamatory speech; 2) obscenity; and 3) fighting
words. The supreme court noted that threats of violence can be regulated
because citizens have an interest in being protected by the government from
fears of violence. Fighting words are such that "by their very utterance
[they] inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'' 92
The court found that section 876.18 was concerned with conduct that came
within these "threats of violence."'1 93 Given the historical background to
cross burning in the United States and its relationship to such lawless
activity as lynchings, shootings, and other means of persecution, the court
easily determined that "[t]he connection between a flaming cross in the yard
and forthcoming violence is clear and direct."' 94 When such a symbol is
placed without authorization on someone's property, it cannot help but to
inflict harm by causing the occupant fear. The Supreme Court of Florida
noted that United States Supreme Court had recently struck down an
ordinance from another state attempting to deal with similar conduct. In
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,195 a juvenile had been charged with placing a
188. The court specifically stated that the conduct which section 876.18 proscribes could
already make one subject to prosecution under a number of other sections of the Florida
Statutes including section 784.011 (assault); section 877.03 (breach of the peace or disorderly
conduct); section 806.13 (criminal mischief); section 823.01 (criminal nuisance); section
877.15 (failure to control or report a dangerous fire); and sections 810.08-.09 (trespassing).
189. State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
190. Id. at 480.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
193. Id. at 481.
194. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d at 481.
195. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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burning cross in a neighbor's yard. The City statute there made it a crime to
"plac[e] on public or private property a symbol.., including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender... ,196 The Court found this ordi-
nance invalid because rather than prescribing all sorts of fighting words, the
ordinance only prohibited them when they offended due to reasons such as
race, color, creed, etc. Therefore, the statute did not provide protection to all
citizens from such fighting words but only to exclusive groups, constituting a
form of impermissible favoritism to certain subjects while prohibiting others.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Florida found that section 876.18,
protected all citizens who had flaming crosses placed, without authorization,
on their property; therefore the law showed no unconstitutional favoritism to
select groups or topics. Once the supreme court found that section 876.18
proscribed fighting words not constitutionally protected, it also had no
difficulty in concluding that the statute was not overbroad. The court agreed
that when applied to conduct, the overbreadth of a challenged statute must be
both real and substantial. Because the conduct prohibited by the statute, the
unauthorized placing of flaming crosses on the property of another, was not
protected by the First Amendment, it likewise could not be considered
unconstitutionally overbroad.19 7 Thus, the supreme court upheld the consti-
tutionality of Florida's cross burning law.
196. Id. (quoting St.Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
197. The Supreme Court of Florida did not directly address the first district's example of
how section 876.18 could be used impermissibly to suppress offensive but protected conduct.
Instead, the supreme court's opinion merely declared that the threat of impermissible
suppression by overbroad application was "speculative at best and is insufficiently substantial
to invalidate the statute on its face." T.B.D., 656 So. 2d at 482. Even if one could conceive of
isolated instances were section 876.18 could be improperly utilized, this was not enough to
find it was substantially overbroad. Id.
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APPENDIX A: SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND RELATED ToPIcs
Cases discussing sentencing guidelines and related topics were a major
focus of a significant number of Supreme Court of Florida cases this last
survey year. Readers interested in these areas should consult the following
recent supreme court decisions as listed below:
A. Sentencing Guidelines
1. Collateral Attack on Departure Sentence
Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1995).
The court found that an improper departure sentence due to the trial
court's failure to timely file written reasons could not be challenged for
the first time through collateral attack under Rules 3.800(a) and 3.850
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, as long as the sentence it-
self was within the maximum period set forth by statute. Such a sen-
tence is not an illegal sentence and thus cannot be considered
"fundamental error" which can be raised in collateral proceedings.
2. Scoring of Prior Convictions on Appeal
State v. Peterson, 667 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1996).
In this decision, the Supreme Court of Florida found that when the de-
fendant is to be sentenced for a subsequent offense, prior convictions on
appeal should be included for scoring purposes on a sentencing
scoresheet. However, the court noted in dicta that if the prior convic-
tion was reversed after the defendant was sentenced for the subsequent
offense, the defendant could file for post-conviction relief. This dicta is
consistent with the supreme court's recent decisions regarding the crime
of felony possession of a firearm. For a discussion of these cases, see
supra text accompanying notes 36-54.
3. Scoring of Out-of-State Convictions
Dautel v. State, 658 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1995).
The court held that only the elements of an out-of-state crime, and not
the underlying facts, should be considered in determining what Florida
offense the out-of-state conviction is analogous to for purposes of
scoring the conviction under the sentencing guidelines.
4. Reasons for Departure
Rahmings v. State, 660 So. 2d 1390 (Fla. 1995).
This case stands for the proposition that a convicted defendant's subse-
quent failure to appear for sentencing was not a valid reason for de-
parting upward from the sentencing guidelines; however, the court dis-
tinguished this decision from its previous decision in Quarterman v.
State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988), where it upheld departure due to the
defendant's failure to appear at sentencing. The accused in Quarter-
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man had agreed, pursuant to a negotiated plea, that such failure would
serve as grounds for a departure. There was no such negotiated plea ar-
rangement in Rahmings.
State v. Darrisaw, 660 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1995).
Here, the court found that a convicted felony defendant who was previ-
ously convicted of two misdemeanors could not be given a departure
sentence based on an escalating pattern of criminal conduct since the
offenses, while "escalating" in nature, were not part of a pattern since
they were not temporally close or similar in nature.
Jory v. State, 668 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1996).
The court concluded that the defendant's professed belief that sexual
acts with minors were not wrong and that his prosecution was part of a
homophobia by the State did not show that the defendant was uname-
nable to rehabilitation and that he posed a danger to society. Thus, the
defendant's statements were inadequate to support an upward departure
under the sentencing guidelines.
5. Correct Sentencing Procedure When Probation Cases are Sentenced in
Conjunction with a New Substantive Offense
State v. Lamar, 659 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1995).
The court held that where two offences exist, two sentencing
scoresheets should be prepared. The new offense should be listed as
the primary offense in one scoresheet and the prior offense in the other.
The sentencing court should then use the scoresheet which would result
in the more severe sanction.
B. Sentences for Misdemeanors
Armstrong v. State, 656 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1995).
A defendant convicted of multiple misdemeanors can be sentenced to
consecutive terms in a county jail even if the cumulative effect of the
sentence exceeds one year.
C. Jury Instructions on Punishment
Knight v. State, 668 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1996).
The court held that a defendant accused of a non-capital offense for
which a minimum mandatory sentence must be imposed is not entitled
to have the jurors instructed as to that minimum mandatory sentence
since it is irrelevant to their decision.
D. Plea Agreements and Sentencing
1. Departure Sentences Pursuant to Plea Agreements
State v. Williams, 667 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1996).
This decision provides authority for the proposition that a departure
sentence imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement does not need to
be accompanied by written reasons for the departure as long as the
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum and the record reflects
the agreement's terms.
2. Withdrawal of Plea Due to Court's Departure from Plea's Terms
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Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1996).
The court found that if there is a firm agreement for a specified sen-
tence, as opposed to an agreement only to recommend a specified sen-
tence, a trial judge's decision to dishonor the agreement gives the de-
fendant the right to withdraw the plea. Furthermore, the defendant does
not have to immediately make a motion to do so in order to preserve the
issue for appeal.
E. Habitual Offender Sentences
1. Habitual Violent Felony Offender
White v. State, 666 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1996).
Here, the court held that a prior conviction for manslaughter by culpa-
ble negligence can serve as a predicate offense for the imposition of a
subsequently convicted felon's sentence as a habitual violent felony of-
fender pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(b)(1) (1995).
See also case cited infra Part I.
2. Collateral Attack on Consecutive Habitual Felony Offender Sentences
State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995).
Defendants who received consecutive habitual felony sentences arising
out of same criminal episode more than two years prior to the decision
in Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, 115 U.S. 278
(1994) (declaring such sentences statutorily impermissible). The de-
fendant should be given a two-year time period after Hale to move pur-
suant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedue for an
evidentiary hearing to challenge these convictions.
F. Control Release
1. Denial of Control Release Eligibility
Gramegna v. Parole Commission, 666 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1996).
The court held that an offender convicted of committing a lewd assault
upon a child pursuant to section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes is auto-
matically, as a matter of law, deemed ineligible by former section
947.146(4)(d) (1991) (which is now codified as section 947.146(3)(c)
(1995)) for control release despite the victim's actual consent to the act
involved.
2. Evidentiary Basis for Denial of Control Release
See id.
In the Gramegna decision, the court also decided, citing section
947.146(3) (1991) of the Florida Statutes, that the Control Release
Commission can rely on any official document in the court record that
was generated during a criminal investigation or proceeding, including
an arrest report, which is similar to the present statutory law.
G. Revocation of Probation
Credit for Time Previously Served
Shoda v. State, 666 So. 2d 134 (Fla 1996).
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When probation is revoked and the accused receives a new community
control sentence, credit must be given for time previously spent on pro-
bation so that the total period does not exceed the statutory maximum
for a particular offense.
Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1995).
A result similar to that obtained in Shoda is required where the new
sentence following a probation revocation is a probationary split sen-
tence combination of actual incarceration followed by probation.
H. Conditions of Probation
Notice to Defendants of Imposition of Conditions
State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1996).
The court construed the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and
found that general conditions 1 to 11 contained in the probation form in
rule 3.986 are standard conditions of probation which need not be
orally announced at sentencing to give adequate notice of such; how-
ever any special conditions of probation must be orally pronounced so
that the defendant has an opportunity to object to them.
I. Stacking of Minimum Mandatory Sentences
Jackson v. State, 659 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1995).
This decision held that a defendant could not be sentenced to a mini-
mum mandatory sentence as a habitual offender followed by a firearm
usage minimum mandatory sentence for offenses occurring within a
single criminal episode.
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APPENDIX B: HOMICIDE OFFENSES
A number of Supreme Court of Florida decisions involving homicide
offenses are not discussed in this article. Readers interested in supreme
court cases discussing whether the state has proven a particular homicide
offense may wish to consult the following cases:
A. First-Degree Murder
1. Insufficient Evidence of Premeditation
Rogers v. State, 660 So. 2d 237, 241 (Fla. 1995).
Here, the court found that there was insufficient evidence of premedita-
tion where the evidence merely showed that the accused shot the victim
during a struggle over a gun as there was no evidence the defendant had
ever "formed a conscious purpose to kill"; however, the court found
sufficient evidence for a second degree murder conviction. Id. (quoting
Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1986).
Mungin v. State, 667 So. 2d 751, 754 (Fla. 1995).
The court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to support a
premeditated murder conviction where the evidence of guilt was wholly
circumstantial and there was no confession or other evidence to suggest
the proof was not "consistent with a killing that occurred on the spur of
the moment;" however, the general first degree murder verdict was af-
finned on the state's alternative theory of felony murder.
2. Sufficient Evidence of Premeditation
Finney v. State, 660 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 823
(1996).
A defendant's contention that he did not kill a bound and gagged victim
who died from multiple stabs wounds was sufficiently inconsistent with
the theory that the victim died during consensual erotic sex that a jury
could find premeditation.
B. Instructions on Premeditation
Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677, 681 (Fla. 1995).
In this decision, the court held that the trial court did not err by adding
language to the standard premeditation instruction. The language stated
that "[a]mong the ways that premeditation may be inferred is from evi-
dence as to the nature of the weapon used, the manner in which the
murder was committed and the nature and manner of the wounds in-
flicted." Apart from the court's use of the word "murder," the remain-
ing language was a correct statement of the law, thus the trial judge
could use it since part of a trial judge's responsibility is to accurately
and completely charge the jury. The court agreed that the word
[Vol. 2 1: 101
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"murder" should not have been used but found that the failure to object
to this at trial waived this issue for appeal.
C. Felony Murder
Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1995).
Kearse also held that an indictment does not need to separately charge
felony murder for the prosecution to proceed on both this theory and
one of premeditated murder; likewise, the state does not have to give
defense notice of the underlying felony that it will use to prove felony
murder.
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